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Abstract
Online advertising has been a long-standing concern for user
privacy and overall web experience. Several techniques have
been proposed to block ads, mostly based on filter-lists and
manually-written rules. While a typical ad blocker relies on
manually-curated block lists, these inevitably get out-of-date,
thus compromising the ultimate utility of this ad blocking
approach.
In this paper we present PERCIVAL, a browser-embedded,
lightweight, deep learning-powered ad blocker. PERCIVAL
embeds itself within the browser’s image rendering pipeline,
which makes it possible to intercept every image obtained
during page execution and to perform blocking based on
applying machine learning for image classification to flag
potential ads.
Our implementation inside both Chromium and Brave
browsers shows only a minor rendering performance
overhead of 4.55%, demonstrating the feasibility of deploying
traditionally heavy models (i.e. deep neural networks) inside
the critical path of the rendering engine of a browser. We
show that our image-based ad blocker can replicate EasyList
rules with an accuracy of 96.76%. To show the versatility
of the PERCIVAL’s approach we present case studies that
demonstrate that PERCIVAL 1) does surprisingly well on
ads in languages other than English; 2) PERCIVAL also
performs well on blocking first-party Facebook ads, which
have presented issues for other ad blockers. PERCIVAL proves
that image-based perceptual ad blocking is an attractive
complement to today’s dominant approach of block lists.
1 Introduction
Online advertising is a dominant force on the web. However,
many studies have shown that ads impose significant privacy
and performance costs to users, and carry the potential to be a
malware delivery vector [3, 28]. Users find ads intrusive [54]
and these disrupt the browsing experience [6]
0Author was employed by Brave software when this work took place.
Several ad blocking techniques have been proposed in the
literature [32]; the majority of these are based on “handcrafted”
filter lists such as EasyList [66], which contain rules matching
ad-carrying URLs (often JavaScript, images, and HTML) and
ad-related DOM elements. These block lists are deployed in
the most widely-used ad blockers, such as uBlock Origin and
Adblock Plus.
Perceptual ad-blocking relies on “visual cues” frequently
associated with ads like the AdChoicesT M logo or a sponsored
content link. The concept of perceptual ad blocking is
predicated on the idea that, ultimately, the intended audience
of an ad is the end-user, so ads should be easily recognizable
by humans [60]. To effectively evade a perceptual ad blocker,
the ad content would need to be distorted significantly [30],
which may both degrade the end-user experience and may
also fall in violation of legal requirements [11].
Storey et al. [61] built the first perceptual ad-blocker
that uses traditional computer vision techniques to detect
ad-identifiers. Recently, Adblock Plus developers built
filters into their ad-blocker [14] to match images against
a fixed template to detect ad labels. Due to variations in
ad-disclosures, AdChoices logo and other ad-identifiers, it
is unlikely that traditional computer vision techniques are
sufficient and generalizable to the unseen. A natural extension
to these techniques is Deep Learning. Deep learning has been
shown to outperform traditional vision techniques on tasks
like image classification [43] and object detection [64]
In this paper, we present a native, deep learning-powered
perceptual ad blocker called PERCIVAL, which blocks ads
based on their visual appearance. We demonstrate that
our model generalizes well across datasets collected using
different crawling techniques at varying times. In addition
to high detection accuracy, our focus is on producing small
and fast models, which can be deployed online within an
actual browser to do real-time ad detection and blocking.
PERCIVAL can be run in addition to an existing ad blocker,
as a last-step measure to block whatever slips through its
filters. However, PERCIVAL may also be deployed outside
the browser, for example, as part of a crawler, whose job
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is to construct comprehensive block lists to supplement
EasyList. We conclude that PERCIVAL provides an attractive
complement to the current method of blocking ads using
crowd-sources filter lists.
1.1 Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions
• Perceptual ad blocking in Chromium-based
browsers. This paper presents PERCIVAL, an approach
to last-step perceptual ad blocking designed to
supplement block list-based blocking techniques.
PERCIVAL analyzes images obtained during page
rendering, using deep neural networks. We demonstrate
two deployment scenarios in this paper, both
implemented and tested in two Chromium-based
browsers, Chrome and Brave: one blocking ads as we
render the page, with an extra performance overhead.
The alternative low-latency approach we propose
is classifying images asynchronously, which allows
for memoization of the results, thus speeding up the
classification process. We make the source code and
pre-trained models available for other researchers at
https://github.com/dxaen/percival.
• Lightweight and accurate deep learning models. We
show that ad blocking can be done effectively using
highly-optimized deep neural network-based models
for image processing. Previous studies have indicated
that models over 5 MB in size become hard to
deploy on mobile devices; because of our focus on
affordable low-latency detection, we create a compressed
in-browser model that is smaller by factor of 74,
compared to other models of this kind [20] without a
significant loss in accuracy.
• Accuracy and performance overhead measurements.
We show that our perceptual ad-blocking model can
replicate EasyList rules with the accuracy of 96.76%,
making PERCIVAL into a viable and complementary
ad-blocking layer. Our implementation within
Chromium shows an average overhead of 178.23ms for
page rendering. This overhead, although non-negligible,
it shows the feasibility of deploying traditionally heavy
models (i.e. deep neural networks) inside the critical
path of the rendering engine of the browser.
• First-party ad blocking. While the focus on traditional
ad blocking is primarily on third-party ad blocking,
PERCIVAL is capable of blocking first-party ads, such as
those found on Facebook. Specifically, our experiments
show that PERCIVAL blocks ads on Facebook (often
referred to as “sponsored content”) with 70% recall and
precision of 78.4%.
• Language-agnostic blocking. We demonstrate that our
model in PERCIVAL is capable of blocking images that
Figure 1: Overall architecture of PERCIVAL. PERCIVAL is positioned in the
renderer process-which is responsible for creating rasterized pixels from
HTML, CSS, JavaScript. As the renderer process creates the DOM and
decodes and rasterizes all image frames, these are first passed through
PERCIVAL. PERCIVAL blocks the frames that are classified as ads. The
corresponding output with ads removed is shown above(right).
are in languages we did not train our model on. We
evaluate our trained model on Arabic, Chinese, Korean,
French and Spanish datasets. Our model achieves an
accuracy of 81.3% on Arabic, 95.1% on Spanish,
and 93.9% on French datasets, with moderately high
precision and recall. This is an important result as it
illustrates the out-of-the box benefit of using PERCIVAL
for languages that have much lower coverage of EasyList
rules, compared to the English ones.
1.2 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of PERCIVAL’s architecture. In
Section 3 we describe our methodology for developing and
compressing our perceptual ad-blocking model. We discuss
the details of implementing the model inside the Blink
rendering engine in Section 4 and in Section 5 evaluate the
accuracy of the PERCIVAL and also the rendering performance
of deploying inside the browser. In Section 6 we discuss
the implications of our results and talk about deployment of
PERCIVAL. In Section 7 we review related work and, finally,
in Section 8 we conclude.
2 PERCIVAL Overview
This paper presents PERCIVAL, a new system for blocking
ads. Our primary goal is to build a system that blocks ad
images that might be allowed by current detection techniques,
while remaining small and efficient enough to run in a mobile
browser. Figure 1 shows how PERCIVAL blocks rendering of
ads. First, PERCIVAL runs in the browser image rendering
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pipeline. By running in the image rendering pipeline, we can
ensure that we inspect all images before the browser shows
them to the user. Second, PERCIVAL uses a deep convolutional
neural network (CNN) for detecting ad images. Using CNNs
enables PERCIVAL to detect a wide range of ad images, even
if they are in a language that PERCIVAL was not trained on.
This section discusses PERCIVAL’s architecture overview,
alternative possible implementations and detection model.
Section 3 discusses the detailed design and implementation
for our browser modifications and our detection model.
2.1 PERCIVAL’s Architecture Overview
PERCIVAL ’s detection module runs in the browser’s image
decoding pipeline, after the browser has decoded the image
into pixels, but before it displays these pixels to the user.
Running PERCIVAL after the browser has decoded an image
takes advantage of the browser’s mature, efficient, and
extensive image decoding logic, while still running at a choke
point before the browser actually displays the decoded pixels.
Simply put, if a user sees an image, it goes through this
pipeline first.
More concretely, as shown in Figure 1 PERCIVAL runs
in the renderer process of the browser engine. The renderer
process on receiving the content of the web page proceeds
to create the intermediate data structures to represent the
web page. These intermediate representations include the
DOM-which encodes the hierarchical structure of the web
page, the layout-tree, which includes the layout information
of all the elements of the web page, and the display-list, which
includes commands to draw the elements on the screen. If
an element has an image contained within it, it needs to go
through the Image Decoding Step before it can be rasterized.
We run PERCIVAL after the Image Decoding Step during
the raster phase which helps run PERCIVAL in parallel for
multiple images at a time. Images that are classified as ads
are blocked from rendering. The web page with ads removed
is shown in Figure 1 (right). We present detailed design and
implementation in Section 3
2.2 Alternative Possible Implementations and
Advantages of PERCIVAL
One alternative to running PERCIVAL directly in the browser
could have been to run PERCIVAL in the browser’s JavaScript
layer via an extension. However, to run PERCIVAL’s logic
in JavaScript would require scanning the DOM to find
image elements, waiting for them to finish loading, and then
screen-shotting the pixels to run the detection model. The
advantage of a JavaScript-based system is that it works within
current browser extensibility mechanisms, but recent work has
shown how attackers can evade this style of detection [65].
Ad blockers that inspect web pages based on the DOM such
as Ad Highlighter [61] are prone to DOM obfuscation attacks.
They assume that the elements of the DOM strictly correspond
to their visual representation. For instance, an ad-blocker that
retrieves all img tags and classifies the content contained in
these elements does not consider the case, where a rendered
image is a result of several CSS or JavaScript transformations
and not the source contained in the tag.
These ad blockers are also prone to resource exhaustion
attacks where the publisher injects a lot of dummy elements
in the DOM to overwhelm the ad blocker.
Additionally, a native implementation is much faster than a
browser extension implementation. A browser extension only
has access to the browser functionality exposed in JavaScript
layer. We also have access to the unmodified image buffers
with a native implementation.
2.3 Detection Model
PERCIVAL runs a detection model on every image loaded
in the document’s main frame, a sub-document such as an
iframe, as well as images loaded in JavaScript to determine
if the image is an ad.
Although running directly within the browser provides
PERCIVAL with more control over the image rendering
process, it introduces a challenge: how to run the model
efficiently in a browser. Our goal is to run PERCIVAL in
browsers that run on laptops or even mobile phones. This
requires that the model be small to be practical [56]. This
design also requires that the model model run directly in
the image rendering pipeline, so overhead must be low. Any
overhead adds latency to rendering for all images it inspects.
In PERCIVAL, we use the SqueezeNet CNN as the starting
point for our detection model. The SqueezeNet inventors
designed it to be small (around 5 MB) and run efficiently on
power-constrained mobile devices, yet still perform well on
image classification tasks. We modify the basic SqueezeNet
network to be optimized for ad blocking by removing less
important layers. This results in a model size that is less
than 2 MB and detects ad images in 11 ms.
A second challenge in using small CNNs is how to
provide enough training data. In general, smaller CNNs can
have suitable performance, but require more training data.
Gathering ad images is non-trivial for a number of reasons,
the number of ad and non-ad images on most web pages
is largely skewed in favor of non-ad images. Most ads are
programatically inserted into the document through iframes
or JavaScript and so simple crawling methods that work only
on the initial HTML of the document will miss most of the
ad images.
To crawl ad images, other researchers [20, 65] propose
screen-shotting iframes or JavaScript elements. This data
collection method leads to problems with synchronizing the
timing of the screenshot and when the element loads. Many
screen-shots end up with whites-space instead of the image
content. Also, this method only makes sense if the input to
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the classifier is the rendered content of the web page.
To address these concerns and to provide ample training
data, we design and implement a custom crawler in Blink
that handles dynamically-updated data and eliminates the
race condition between the browser displaying the content
and the screenshot we use to capture the image data. Our
custom-crawler downloads and labels ad and non-ad images
directly from the rendering pipeline.
3 Design and Implementation of PERCIVAL
This section covers the design and implementation of the
browser portion of PERCIVAL. We first cover the high-level
design principles that guide our design, then we discuss
rendering and image handling in Blink, the rendering engine
of Google Chrome and the Brave browser. Finally, we
describe our end-to-end implementation within Blink.
3.1 Design Goals
We have two main goals in our design of PERCIVAL:
Run PERCIVAL at a choke point: Advertisers can serve
ad images in different formats, such as JPG, PNG, or GIF.
Depending on the format of the image, an encoded frame
can traverse different paths in the rendering pipeline. Also,
a wide range of web constructs can cause the browser
to load images, including HTML image tags, JavaScript
image objects, HTML Canvas elements, or CSS background
attributes. Our goal is to find a single point in the browser
to run PERCIVAL, such that it inspects all images, operates
on pixels instead of encoded images, but does so before the
user sees the pixels on the screen, enabling PERCIVAL to
block ad image cleanly. Note: If individual pixels are drawn
programmatically on canvas, PERCIVAL will not block it from
rendering.
In Blink, the raster task within the rendering pipeline
enables PERCIVAL to inspect, and potentially block, all
images. Regardless of the image format or how the browser
loads it, the raster task decodes the given image into raw
pixels, which it then passes to the GPU to display the content
on the screen. We run PERCIVAL at this precise point to
abstract different image formats and loading techniques, while
still retaining the opportunity to block an image before the
user sees it.
Run multiple instances of PERCIVAL in parallel:
Running PERCIVAL in parallel is a natural design goal
because PERCIVAL makes all image classification decisions
independently based solely on the pixels of each individual
image. When designing PERCIVAL, we look for opportunities
to exploit this natural parallelism to minimize the latency
added due to the addition of our ad blocking model.
Figure 2: PERCIVAL in the image decoding pipeline. SkImage
Generator allocates a bitmap and calls the onGetPixels() of
DecodingImageGenerator to populate the bitmap. This bitmap is
then passed to the network for classification and cleared if it contains an ad.
3.2 Rendering and PERCIVAL: Overview
We integrate PERCIVAL into Blink, the rendering engine for
Google Chrome and Brave. From a high level, Blink’s primary
function is to turn a web page into the appropriate GPU
calls [5] to show the user the rendered content.
A web page can be thought of as a collection of HTML,
CSS, and JavaScript code, which the browser fetches from the
network. The rendering engine parses this code to build the
DOM and layout tree, and to issue OpenGL calls via Skia,
Google’s graphics library [22].
The layout tree contains the locations of the regions the
DOM elements will occupy on the screen. This information
together with the DOM element is encoded as a display
item. The browser follows this parsing process by the
rasterization process, which takes the display items and turns
them into bitmaps. Rasterization issues OpenGL draw calls
via the Skia library to draw bitmaps. If the display list items
have images in them (a common occurrence), the browser
must decode these images before drawing them via Skia.
PERCIVAL intercepts the rendering process at this precise
point, after the Image Decode Task and during the Raster
Task. As the renderer process creates the DOM and decodes
and rasterizes all image frames, these are first passed through
PERCIVAL. PERCIVAL blocks the frames that are classified
as ads.
3.3 End-to-End Implementation in Blink
In our Blink instrumentation, we deal with Skia and Blink
classes. Most of the code (forward pass of the CNN) resides
at the same directory level as Blink.
Skia uses a set of image decoding operations to turn
SkImages, which is the internal class type within Skia that
encapsulates images, into bitmaps. PERCIVAL reads these
bitmaps and classifies their content accordingly. If PERCIVAL
classifies the bitmap as an ad, we block it by removing its
content. Otherwise, PERCIVAL lets it pass through to the next
layers of the rendering process. In case the content is cleared,
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we have several options on how to fill up the surrounding
white-space. We can either collapse it by propagating the
information upwards or display a predefined image (user’s
spirit animal) in place of the ad.
Figure 2 shows an overview of our Blink integration.
Blink class BitmapImage creates an instance of
DeferredImageDecoder which in turn instantiates a
SkImage object for each encoded image. SkImage creates an
instance of DecodingImageGenerator (blink class) which
will in turn decode the image using the relevant image
decoder from Blink. Note that the image hasn’t been decoded
yet since chromium practices deferred image decoding.
Finally, SkImageGenerator allocates bitmaps
corresponding to the encoded SkImage, and calls
onGetPixels() of DecodingImageGenerator to decode
the image data using the proper image decoder. This method
populates the buffer (pixels) that contain decoded pixels,
which we pass to PERCIVAL along with the image height,
width, channels information (SKImageInfo) and other
image metadata. PERCIVAL reads the image, scales it
to 224×224×4 (default input size expected by SqueezeNet),
creates a tensor, and passes it through the CNN. If PERCIVAL
determines that the buffer contains an ad, it clears the buffer,
effectively blocking the image frame.
Rasterization, image decoding, and the rest of the
processing happen on a raster thread. Blink rasters on a per
tile basis and each tile is like a resource that can be used by
the GPU. In a typical scenario there are multiple raster threads
each rasterizing different raster tasks in parallel. PERCIVAL
runs in each of these worker threads after image decoding and
during rasterization, which runs the model in parallel.
As opposed to Sentinel [58] and Ad Highlighter [29]
the input to PERCIVAL is not the rendered version of web
content; PERCIVAL takes in the Image pixels directly from
the image decoding pipeline. This is important since with
PERCIVAL we have access to unmodified image buffers and
it helps prevent attacks where publishers modify content of
the webpage (including iframes) with overlaid masks (using
CSS techniques) meant to fool the the ad blocker classifier.
4 Deep Learning Pipeline
This section covers the design of PERCIVAL’s deep neural
network, as well as the training workflow for developing our
ad-blocking system. We first introduce the building blocks of
a traditional convolution neural network, we then describe the
network employed by PERCIVAL and the training process.
Finally, we describe our data acquisition and labelling
techniques.
4.1 Background and Terminology
Convolution neural networks (CNN) [44] are a variant of
neural networks commonly used for visual recognition. The
input is usually an image and the network outputs a set of
probabilities. The intermediate values generated in the process
are called feature maps and can be thought of as multiple
images stacked together.
Due to the higher dimensionality of visual data, CNNs
share learned parameters across the network. The input
images are also down-sampled as these pass through the
network. This is accomplished by convolving the input
image with small shared filters and then down-sampling the
output to the desired dimension. Accordingly, convolution
and down-sampling constitute the two basic operations in
a CNN. Each convolution filter detects a feature over some
region of the input image, while also preserving the spatial
locality of the image.
The down-sampling or pooling layer either computes
an average or maximum value over some neighborhood
of the input. The value computed is representative of the
neighborhood and can be used in its place. This helps
to reduce the dimensionality of the input feature maps,
while also making the network robust to small variations.
Additionally, as with traditional neural networks CNNs also
feature a SoftMax layer; this layer turns the output feature
maps into probabilities that sum to 1. Normalizing the output
feature maps helps reason about the likelihood of one class
over another.
4.2 PERCIVAL’s CNN Architecture
We cast ad detection as a traditional image classification
problem, where we feed images into our model and it classifies
them as either being (1) an ad, or (2) not an ad. CNNs are
the current standard in the computer vision community for
classifying images. As such, we tried several standard CNNs
on our dataset, including Inception-V4 [62], Inception [63],
and ResNet-52 [33]. With minor modifications, all of these
standard networks classify ads accurately (97–99% accuracy)
on our datasets. However, the model size and the classification
time of these systems was prohibitive for our purposes.
Because of the prohibitive size and speed of standard
image classifiers, in PERCIVAL we use a small network,
SqueezeNet [39], as the starting point for our in-browser
model. The SqueezeNet authors show that SqueezeNet
achieves comparable accuracy to much larger CNNs, like
AlexNet, and boasts a final model size of 4.8 MB. This
reduced model size makes SqueezeNet a compelling starting
point for the PERCIVAL model.
SqueezeNet consists of multiple fire modules. A fire module
consists of a “squeeze” layer, which is a convolution layer
with 1× 1 filters that reduces the number of channels by a
factor of 14 to
1
8 . This is followed by two “expand” convolution
layers with filter sizes of 1× 1 and 3× 3, respectively, that
increase the number of channels by a factor of 14 each.
Overall, fire modules reduce the number of input channels to
larger convolution filters in the pipeline. Traditionally, larger
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filters are needed to capture the spatial information in an
image. However, these filters also increase the number of
operations and classification time (forward passes in neural
networks terminology).
A visual summary of network structure is shown in
Figure 3. Our modified network consists of a convolution
layer, followed by 6 fire modules and a final convolution
layer, a global average pooling layer and a SoftMax layer.
As opposed to the original SqueezeNet, we down-sample the
feature maps at regular intervals in the network. This helps
reduce the classification time per image. We also perform
max-pooling after the first convolution layer and after every
two fire modules.
4.3 Training and Fine-Tuning
Before training the network in PERCIVAL, we initialized the
blocks Convolution 1, Fire1, Fire2, Fire3, and Fire4, using
the weights from a SqueezeNet model pre-trained with
ImageNet [43]. The goal of using the weights from a
previously-trained model is to reuse the feature extraction
mechanism (also known as representation learning [26]) that
was trained on the original network with a much bigger
dataset. This way we can continue training on examples that
are only relevant to the task we are trying to solve, therefore
avoiding the need for a very large dataset.
To determine the hyper parameters for training PERCIVAL
we started with the recommendations from Bengio et al. [25].
This was followed by baby-sitting the training process to
manually determine the correct configuration of training hyper
parameters. Ultimately, we trained PERCIVAL with stochastic
gradient descent, momentum (β= 0.9), learning rate 0.001,
and batch size of 24. We also used step learning rate decay
and decayed the learning rate by a multiplicative factor 0.1
after every 30 epochs.
4.4 Data Acquisition
We use two systems to collect training image data. First, we
use a traditional crawler and traditional ad-blocking rules
(EasyList [7]) to identify ad images. Second, we use our
browser instrumentation from PERCIVAL to collect images,
improving on some of the issues we encountered with our
traditional crawler.
4.4.1 Crawling with EasyList
We use a traditional crawler matched with a traditional
rule-based ad blocker to identify ad content for our first
dataset. In particular, to identify ad elements which could
be iframes or complex JavaScript constructs, we use EasyList,
which is a set of rules that identify ads based on the URL of
the elements, location within the page, origin, class or id tag,
Figure 3: Original SqueezeNet (left) and PERCIVAL’s fork of SqueezeNet
(right). For Conv, Maxpool2D, and Avgpool blocks a× b represents the
dimensions of the filters used. For fire blocks a, b represents the number of
intermediate and output channels. We remove extraneous blocks as well as
downsample the feature maps at regular intervals to reduce the classification
time per image.
(a) Ad image: Layer 9 (b) Ad image: Layer 5
(c) Ad image: Layer 5 (d) No Ad image: Layer 5
Figure 4: Salience map of the network on a sample ad and no-ad images.
Each image corresponds to the output of Grad-CAM [57] for the layer in
question.
and other hand-crafted characteristics known to indicate the
presence of ad content.
We built a crawler using Selenium [19] for browser
automation. We then use the crawler to visit Alexa top-1,000
web sites, waiting for 5 seconds on each page, and then
randomly selecting 3 links and visiting them, while waiting
on each page for a period of 5 seconds as before. For every
visit, the crawler applies every EasyList network, CSS and
exception rule.
For every element that matches an EasyList rule, our
crawler takes a screenshot of the component, cropped tightly
to the coordinates reported by Chromium, and then stores
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Figure 5: Crawling, labelling and re-training with PERCIVAL. Every decoded
image frame is passed through PERCIVAL and PERCIVAL downloads the
image frame into the appropriate bucket.
it as an ad sample. We capture non-ad samples by taking
screenshots of the elements that do not match any of the
EasyList rules. Using this approach we, extract 22,670 images
out of which 13,741 are labelled as ads, and 8,929 as non-ads.
This automatic process was followed by a semi-automated
post-processing step, which includes removing duplicate
images, as well as manual spot-checking for misclassified
images.
Eventually, we identify 2,003 ad images and 7,432 non-ad
images. To balance the positive and negative examples in our
dataset so the classifier doesn’t favor one class over another,
we limited the number of non ad and ad images to 2,000.
4.4.2 Crawling with PERCIVAL
We found that traditional crawling was good enough to
bootstrap the ad classification training process, but it has
the fundamental disadvantage that for dynamically-updated
elements, the meaningful content is often unavailable at the
time of the screenshot, leading to screenshots filled with
white-space.
More concretely, the page load event is not very reliable
when it comes to loading iframes. Oftentimes when we take a
screenshot of the webpage after the page load event, most of
the iframes don’t appear in the screenshots. Even if we wait
a fixed amount of time before taking the screenshot, iframes
constantly keep on refreshing, making it difficult to capture
the rendered content within the iframe consistently.
To handle dynamically-updated data, we use PERCIVAL’s
browser architecture to read all image frames after the browser
has decoded them, eliminating the race condition between
the browser displaying the content and the screenshot we use
to capture the image data. This way we are guaranteed to
capture all the iframes that were rendered, independently of
the time of rendering or refresh rate.
Instrumentation: Figure 5 shows how we use PERCIVAL’s
browser instrumentation to capture image data. Each encoded
image invokes an instance of DecodingImageGenerator
inside Blink, which in turn decodes the image using the
relevant image decoder (PNG, GIFs, JPG, etc.). We use the
buffer passed to the decoder to store pixels in a bitmap
image file, which contains exactly what the render engine
sees. Additionally, the browser passes this decoded image to
PERCIVAL, which determines whether the image contains an
ad. This way, every time the browser renders an image, we
automatically store it and label it using our initially trained
network, resulting in a much cleaner dataset.
Crawling: To crawl for ad and non-ad images, we run our
PERCIVAL-based crawler with a browser automation tool
called Puppeteer [18]. In each phase, the crawler visits the
landing page of each Alexa top-1,000 websites, waits until
networkidle0 (when there are no more than 0 network
connections for at least 500 ms) or 60 seconds. We do this
to ensure that we give the ads enough time to load. Then
our crawler finds all internal links embedded in the page.
Afterwards, it visits 20 randomly selected links for each page,
while waiting for networkidle0 event or 60 seconds time
out on each request.
In each phase, we crawl between 40,000 to 60,000 ad
images. We then post process the images to remove duplicates,
leaving around 15-20% of the collected results as useful. We
crawl for a total of 8 phases, retraining PERCIVAL after each
stage with the data obtained from the current and all the
previous crawls. As before, we cap the number of non-ad
images to the amount of ad image to ensure a balanced dataset.
This process was spread-out in time over 4 months,
repeated every 15 days for a total of 8 phases, where each
phase took 5 days. Our final dataset contains 63,000 unique
images in total with a balanced split between positive and
negative samples.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of PERCIVAL
in different settings. In Section 5.1, we validate PERCIVAL
on an a random sample from the dataset created by
Hussain et al. [38], which consists of 64,832 images annotated
using Mechanical Turk workers. We train on our own dataset
and test on the mentioned external dataset. In Section 5.2, we
assess the accuracy of PERCIVAL by comparing against filter
lists. In Section 5.3 we measure the accuracy of PERCIVAL on
Facebook ads and sponsored content. In Section 5.4 we test
PERCIVAL by fetching images from Google Image Search
and report blocking results on various search queries. In
Section 5.5, we analyze the performance of PERCIVAL on ads
in languages other than English. In Section 5.6 we explore the
features that our network learned by extracting the salience
maps of the network. Finally, in Section 5.7 we present a
run-time performance evaluation on both Chromium and
Brave browsers equipped with PERCIVAL.
5.1 Accuracy Against an External Dataset
To validate our crawling procedure, training and network
architecture, we tested PERCIVAL on the data set published
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with Hussain et al. [38]. Our model was trained on the data
set that we constructed by crawling top 500 Alexa sites.
We gathered a total of 38,861 ad images, out of which we
used 33,000 for training and 5,861 for validation. We then
tested with a random sample of 5,024 ads from the dataset
gathered by Hussain et al. [38]. Figure 8 shows the results of
this experiment.
5.2 Accuracy Against EasyList
To evaluate whether PERCIVAL can be a viable shield against
ads, we conduct a comparison against the most popular
crowd-sourced ad blocking list, EasyList [7], currently being
used by extensions such as Adblock Plus [1], uBlock
Origin [23] and Ghostery [12].
Methodology: For our comparison we created two data sets,
each one based on Alexa’s top 500 news sites.
• We applied EasyList rules to select DOM elements
that are potentially containers of ads (IFRAMEs, DIVs,
etc.); we then captured screenshots of the contents of
these elements, resulting in 6,930 images. We manually
labelled them to identify the false positives.
• We used resource-blocking rules from EasyList to label
all the images of each page according to their resource
URL.
We refer to these two datasets as screenshots and
images, respectively, and summarize dataset characteristics
in Figure 6.
Performance: On our evaluation dataset, PERCIVAL is
able to replicate the EasyList rules with accuracy 96.76%,
precision 97.76% and recall 95.72% (Figure 7), illustrating a
viable alternative to the manually-curated filter-lists.
5.3 Blocking Facebook Ads
Facebook’s business model depends on serving first-party
ads. Facebook obfuscates the “signatures” of ad elements (e.g.
HTML classes and identifiers) used by filter lists to block ads.
Over the years, the ad blocking community and Facebook
have been playing a game of cat and mouse, where the ad
blocking community identifies the ad signatures to block the
ads and Facebook responds by changing the ad signatures
or at times even the website [17]. Until recently, Adblock
plus was able to block all ads and sponsored content for
more than a year [2], however recently (late 2018) Facebook
ads successfully managed to evade Adblock plus as the ad
post code now looks identical to normal posts [10, 13] and
rule-based filtering cannot detect these ads and sponsored
content any more.
Sponsored posts and ads on Facebook generally look like
ads and so far Facebook does not obfuscate the content of
Dataset Size Matched rules
CSS rules 5,000 20.2%
Network 5,000 31.1%
Figure 6: Size of the data-set and percentage of ads identified by EasyList.
Images Ads Identified Accuracy Precision Recall
6,930 3466 96.76% 97.76% 95.72%
Figure 7: Summary of the results obtained by testing the dataset gathered
using EasyList with PERCIVAL.
these posts, since Facebook is required to follow the rules on
misleading advertising [10,11]. Even though this requirement
favors perceptual ad blockers over traditional ones, a lot of
the content on Facebook is user-created which complicates
the ability to model ad and non-ad content.
In this section, we assess the accuracy of PERCIVAL on
blocking Facebook ads and sponsored content.
Methodology: To evaluate PERCIVAL’s performance on
Facebook, we browse Facebook with PERCIVAL for a
period of 35 days using two non-burner accounts that have
been in use for over 9 years. Every visit is a typical
Facebook browsing session, where we browse through the
feed, visit friends’ profiles, and different pages of interest.
For desktop computers two most popular places to serve
ads is the right-side columns and within the feed (labelled
sponsored) [9].
For our purposes, we consider content served in these
elements as ad content and everything else as non-ad content.
A true positive (TP) is defined as the number of ads correctly
blocked, a true negative (TN) as the number of non-ads
correctly rendered (or not blocked), a false positive (FP) as the
number of non-ads incorrectly blocked and false negative (FN)
is the number of ads PERCIVAL missed to block. For every
session, we manually compute these numbers. Figure 10
shows the aggregate numbers from all the browsing sessions
undertaken. Figure 12a shows PERCIVAL blocking right-side
columns correctly and Figure 12b shows PERCIVAL blocking
sponsored content within the feed correctly in addition to the
right-side column ads.
Results: Our experiments show that PERCIVAL blocks ads on
Facebook with a 92% accuracy and 0.784 and 0.7 as precision
and recall, respectively. Figure 10 shows the complete results
from this experiment. Even though we achieve the accuracy
of 92%, there is a considerable number of false positives and
false negatives, and as such, precision and recall are lower.
The classifier always picks out the ads in the right-columns
but struggles with the ads embedded in the feed. This is the
source of majority of the false negatives. False positives come
from high “ad intent” user-created content, as well as content
created by brand or product pages on Facebook (Figure 11).
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Size (images) Acc. Size Avg. time Precision Recall F1
5,024 0.877 1.9 MB 11 ms 0.815 0.976 0.888
Figure 8: PERCIVAL classification results on the dataset created by
Hussain et al. [38]
Language Images crawled Ads Identified Accuracy Precision Recall
Arabic 5008 2747 81.3% 0.833 0.825
Spanish 2539 309 95.1% 0.768 0.889
French 2414 366 93.9% 0.776 0.904
Korean 4296 506 76.9% 0.540 0.920
Chinese 2094 527 80.4% 0.742 0.715
Figure 9: Accuracy of PERCIVAL on ads in non-English languages. The
second column represents the number of images we crawled, while the third
column is the number of images that were identified as ads by a native speaker.
The remaining columns indicate how well PERCIVAL is able to reproduce
these labels.
Ads Non-ads Accuracy FP FN TP TN Precision Recall
354 1,830 92.0% 68 106 248 1,762 0.784 0.7
Figure 10: Online evaluation of Facebook ads and sponsored content.
(a) False Positive: This post was
created by page owned by Dell
Corp.
(b) False Negative: This post was
part of the sponsored content in
the news feed.
Figure 11: Examples of false positives and false negatives on Facebook.
5.4 Blocking Google Image Search Results
To improve our understanding of the misclassifications of
PERCIVAL, we used Google Images as a way to fetch images
from distributions that have high or low ad intent. For example,
we fetched results with the query “Advertisement” and used
PERCIVAL to classify and block images. As we can see
in Figure 16b, out of the top 23 images, 20 of them were
successfully blocked. Additionally, we tested with examples
of low ad intent distribution we used the query “Obama”).
As we can see in Figure 16a, out of 100 top images, only 12
images where blocked. We also searched for other keywords,
such as “Pastry”, “Shoes”, “Coffee”, etc. The detailed results
are presented in Figure 13. As shown, PERCIVAL can identify
a significant percentage of images on a highly ad-biased
content.
5.5 Language-Agnostic Detection
We test PERCIVAL against images with language content
different than the one we trained on. In particular, we source
(a) PERCIVAL blocking Facebook ads
(b) PERCIVAL blocking sponsored content embedded in the feed in
addition to ads.
Figure 12: The screenshots show one of the author’ Facebook home page
accessed with PERCIVAL. The black rectangles are not part of the original
screenshot.
Search query Images blocked Images rendered FP FN
Obama 12 88 12 0
Advertisement 96 4 0 4
Shoes 56 44 - -
Pastry 14 86 - -
Coffee 23 77 - -
Detergent 85 15 10 6
iPhone 76 24 23 1
Figure 13: PERCIVAL blocking image search results. For each search we only
consider the first 100 images returned (“-” represents cases where we were
not able to determine whether the content served is ad or non-ad).
a data set of images in Arabic, Chinese, German, French,
Korean and Spanish.
Crawling: To crawl for ad and non-ad images, we use
ExpressVPN [8] to VPN into major world cities where
the above mentioned languages are spoken. For instance,
to crawl Korean ads, we VPN into two locations in Seoul.
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Figure 14: Render time evaluation in Chromium and Brave browser.
Baseline Treatment Overhead (%) (ms)
Chromium Chromium + PERCIVAL 4.55 178.23
Brave Brave + PERCIVAL 19.07 281.85
Figure 15: Performance evaluation of PERCIVAL on Render metric.
We then manually visit top 10 websites as mentioned in
SimilarWeb [21] list. We engage with the ad-networks by
clicking on ads, as well as closing the ads (icon at the top
right corner of the ad) and then choosing random responses
like content not relevant or ad seen multiple times. This is
done to ensure we are served ads from the language of the
region.
We then run PERCIVAL-based crawler with the browser
automation tool Puppeteer [18]. Our crawler visits the landing
page of each top 50 SimilarWeb websites for the given region,
waits until networkidle0 (when there are no more than 0
network connections for at least 500 ms) or 60 seconds. Then
our crawler finds all internal links embedded in the page.
Afterwards, it visits 10 randomly selected links for each page,
while waiting for networkidle0 event or 60 seconds time out
on each request. As opposed to Section 4.4.2, we download
every image frame to a single bucket.
Labeling: For each language, we crawl 2,000–6,000 images.
We then hire a native speaker of the language under
consideration and have them label the data crawled for that
language. Afterwards, we test PERCIVAL with this labeled
dataset to determine how accurately can PERCIVAL reproduce
these human annotated labels. Figure 9 shows the detailed
results from all languages we test on.
Results: Our experiments show that PERCIVAL can
generalize to different languages with high accuracy (81.3%
for Portuguese, 95.1% for Spanish, 93.9% for French)
and moderately high precision and recall (0.833, 0.825 for
Arabic, 0.768, 0.889 for Spanish, 0.776, 0.904 for French).
This illustrates the out-of-the box benefit of using PERCIVAL
for languages that have much lower coverage of EasyList
(a) Search results from searching for “Barack Obama” on Google
images using PERCIVAL.
(b) Search results from searching for “Advertisement” on Google
images, using PERCIVAL.
rules, compared to the English ones. The model does not
perform as well on Korean and Chinese datasets.
5.6 Salience Map of the CNN
While Convolutional Neural Networks [43] have superior
performance compared to other computer vision techniques,
they suffer from interpretability problems; it is difficult to
understand why the network predicts a certain label. To
visualize which segments of the image are influencing the
classification decision, we used Grad-CAM [57] network
salience mapping which allow us to highlight the important
regions in the image that caused the prediction.
As we can see in Figure 4, our network is focusing on ad
visual cues (AdChoice logo), when this is present (case (a)),
also it follows the outlines of text (signifying existence of text
between white space) or identifies features of the object of
interest (wheels of a car). In case (d), it focuses on the clothing
but also tracks some area from the sea. This is compatible
with our intuition that ad images usually contain some text
or visual cues but also common objects such as cars, clothes,
etc.
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(a) PERCIVAL results on record.pt (Portuguese
language website).
(b) PERCIVAL results on sohu.com (Chinese language
website).
Figure 17: PERCIVAL results on a few sites written in Non-English languages.
5.7 Runtime Performance Evaluation
We next evaluate the impact of PERCIVAL-based blocking
on the performance of surrounding browser. This delay is a
function to the number and complexity of the images on the
page and the time the classifier takes to classify each of them.
We measure the rendering time impact when we classify each
image synchronously.
To evaluate the performance of our system, we used
top 5,000 URLs from Alexa to test against Chromium
compiled on Ubuntu Linux 16.04, with and without
PERCIVAL activated. We also tested PERCIVAL in Brave,
a privacy-oriented Chromium-based browser, which blocks
ads using block lists by default. For each experiment we
measured render time which is defined as the difference
between domComplete and domLoading events timestamps.
We conducted the evaluations sequentially on the same
Amazon m5.large EC2 instance to avoid interference with
other processes and make the comparison fair. Also, all the
experiments where using xvfb for rendering, an in-memory
display server which allowed us to run the tests without a
display.
In our evaluation we show an increase of 178.23 ms of
median render time when running PERCIVAL in the rendering
critical path of Chromium and 281.85 ms when running inside
Brave browser with ad-blocker and shields on. Figures 14
and 15 summarize the results.
6 Discussion
Deployment Concerns: In this paper, we primarily focus on
deploying PERCIVAL as an in-browser blocker. There are
significant advantages to implementing this in the code of the
browser in C++ rather than as a browser extension.
However, we note that this is not the only way to use our
approach. PERCIVAL can be used to build and enhance block
lists for traditional ad blockers. For that we would need to
set up a crawling infrastructure to find URLs and potentially
DOM XPath expressions to block.
How to properly orchestrate crawling is not entirely clear:
the simple approach of crawling a subset of the most popular
sites such as those provided by Alexa will likely miss the long
tail — unpopular sites that are not reached by such crawls but
are reached by the long tail of users. However, we can still use
such techniques to frequently update block lists automatically.
Yet a third approach is to collect URLs (and possibly XPath
expressions) in the browser that are not already blocked by
existing block lists, and then to crowd-source these from a
variety of users.
However, all these techniques come with different user
privacy trade-offs. Blocking too late in the pipeline (e.g.
during rendering) provides context that opens the doors
for machine learning based blocking techniques, sacrificing
though the privacy of the user since the tracking mechanisms
might have already run at this stage. On the other hand,
blocking too early allows for higher privacy guarantees, but
the blocking accuracy will depend on the effectiveness of the
filter lists. We believe that a hybrid of rendering time and filter
lists based blocking can help the creation of effective shields
against ads that balance the trade-offs between accuracy and
privacy.
Limitations: By testing PERCIVAL integrated into
Chromium, we noticed the following limitations. Many ads
consist of multiple elements, which contain images and text
information layered together. PERCIVAL is positioned in the
rendering engine, and therefore it has access to one image at
a time. This leads to situations where we effectively block the
image, but the text is left dangling. Unfortunately the nature
of the in-rendering blocking does not allow post-rendering
DOM tree manipulations, however, an effective solution to
this would be to memorize the DOM element that contains
the blocked image and filter it out on consecutive page
visitations. Although this might provide an unsatisfying
experience to the user, we argue that it is of the benefit of the
user to eventually have a good ad blocking experience, even
if this is happening on a second page visit.
Finally, as it has been demonstrated by Tramèr et al. [65],
computer-vision based ad blockers suffer from adversarial
attacks, where an attacker can perturb an image in order
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Figure 18: Example of an ad. Ads usually contain (1) body text, (2) image
text, (3) ad image.
to confuse the underlying classifier. Although this remains
an open problem in the deep computer-vision community,
there is a promising body of research [41, 42, 45, 46, 48] that
is proposing solutions to mitigate the exploitability of such
models. One way to partly address this in PERCIVAL is to
incorporate back-propagation algorithm into the browser and
retrain the model client side.
7 Related Work
Ad blocking: Online advertisement has contributed to
the degradation of the user experience and has severely
encroached on end-user privacy. The effectiveness of ad
blocking has also been diminishing for a long time. To address
these issues, browser extensions and ad-blocking browsers
such as Brave and Opera [4, 15] have been developed that are
blocking online ads and trackers. As of February 2017, 615
million devices had ad-blockers installed [16]. The
significance and success of ad-blockers have turned the
online advertising industry into anti-ad-blockers solutions
and have created an arms-race between ad-blockers and
advertisers [50]. As a response to the increasing popularity of
ad-blockers, online advertisers have adopted anti-ad-blocking
techniques as surveyed in [49].
Filter lists: Popular ad-blockers like, Adblock Plus [1],
uBlock Origin [23], and Ghostery [12] are using a set
of rules, called filter-list, to block resources that match a
predefined crowd-sourced list of regular expressions (from
lists like EasyList and EasyPrivacy). On top of that, CSS
rules are applied, to prevent DOM elements that are potential
containers of ads. These filter-lists are crowd-sourced and
updated frequently to adjust on the non-stationary nature
of the online ads [60]. For example, EasyList, the most
popular filter-list, has a history of 9 years and contains
more than 60.000 rules [67]. However, filter-list based
solutions enable a continuous cat-and-mouse game: their
maintenance cannot scale efficiently, as they depend on the
human-annotator and they do not generalize to “unseen”
examples.
Machine Learning Based Ad Blockers: Lately, techniques
based on machine learning started to emerge. AdGraph [40]
proposes a supervised machine-learning solution on the
multi-layered graph representing the interaction of the HTML,
HTTP and JavaScript of the page to identify ads and trackers.
We see this work as complementary to ours since it exploits
the latent interactions that happen inside the browser, to
identify the resources of interest.
Perceptual Ad Blocking: Perceptual ad blocking is the idea
of blocking ads based solely on their appearance; an example
ad, highlighting some for the typical components, is shown in
Figure 18. Storey et al. [60] uses the rendered image content to
identify ads. More specifically, they use OCR and fuzzy image
search techniques to identify visual cues such as ad disclosure
markers or sponsored content links. Unlike PERCIVAL, this
work assumes that the ad provider is complying with the
legislation and is using visual cues like AdChoices. They also
suggest using perceptual ad blocking for FB ads, although it
appears that their technique relies chiefly on text matching
and not training on a large number of images; further, they do
not present an accuracy evaluation for their approach.
Sentinel system [58] proposes a solution based on
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to identify Facebook
ads. This work is closer to our proposal; however, their model
is not deployable in mobile devices or desktop computers
because of its large size (based on YOLO [55] which
is >200MB). We report on the performance of PERCIVAL
on Facebook ads in Section 5.3.
Also, we would like to mention the work of [24, 38,
68], where they use deep neural networks to identify the
represented signifiers in the Ad images. This is a promising
direction in semantic and perceptual ad-blocking.
CNN image classification and model compression:
Convolutional neural networks have been used for more
than 20 years. Lecun et al. introduced CNN in [47].
Models like [44] have demonstrated that the power
of Deep convolutional neural networks and since then
they have become the state-of-the-art in the image
classification tasks. More specifically, significant Deep Neural
network architectures like [34, 59, 63] are being used
currently in several commercial applications. However, these
resource-hungry architectures cannot be deployed on devices
with limited resources.
To address these issues, [39] proposed an architecture that
can get AlexNet comparable accuracy with a model that is
less than 0.5 MB. The authors introduced a novel network
architecture combined with training tricks that helped them
compress the same amount of knowledge on a significantly
less size. Similarly, [36] has proposed models that are
deployable on mobile devices making them appealing for
commercial applications on devices with limited resources.
In [55], the authors demonstrated a real-time object
detection system, with state-of-the-art accuracy. Although
this model would be a great candidate to base PERCIVAL on,
the model size (235 MB) is prohibitive for laptop or mobile
browsers. Relevant to model compression is also the network
distillation work from Hinton et al. [35].
However, these techniques do not come without drawbacks.
In the seminal work Goodfellow et al. [30], demonstrated the
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technique that came to be known as adversarial attacks of
machine-learning models.
Adversarial attacks: One can generate adversarial examples
that when “input to machine learning models causes the model
to make a mistake” [30]. In computer-vision, researchers
have demonstrated attacks that can cause prediction errors
by near-imperceptible perturbations of the input image.
This poses risks in a wide range of applications on which
computer vision is a critical component (e.g. autonomous
cars, surveillance systems) [51–53]. Similar attacks have been
demonstrated in speech to text [27], malware detection [31]
and reinforcement-learning [37].
In [65], Tramèr et al. analyzed the security risks of
perceptual ad-blockers and showed that state-of-the-art
perceptual ad-blockers are vulnerable to several attacks.
However, most of the attacks presented work on
element-based or frame-based perceptual ad-blockers.
Element-based perceptual ad-blockers segment pages into
HTML elements and assume a strict correspondence between
elements in the DOM and how these are displayed in the
webpage. PERCIVAL is not an element-based ad-blocker and
operates on every image obtained during page execution
regardless of which element displays it. Frame based
perceptual ad-blockers map DOM to the rendered content.
Attacks against these ad-blockers also involve DOM
obfuscation and as such don’t work with PERCIVAL. Attacks
like Ad-Block Evasion for all website [65] where a publisher
perturbs the full webpage using pixel level CSS techniques
don’t work with PERCIVAL either since PERCIVAL intercepts
the image directly from the rendering pipeline. Page-based
perceptual ad-blockers [20] work on images of the entire
webpages and ignore DOM. Tramer et al. [65] demonstrated
how these ad-blockers are suceptible to Cross-Boundary
blocking, where a malicious user can upload adversarial
content on part of the page which triggers the ad-blocker
to block some other non-ad part. PERCIVAL makes each
blocking decision independently so one blocking decision
does not affect another.
Adversarial machine learning, on the other hand, is the
most potent threat to perceptual ad-blocking. Advertisers can
use the original neural network to create adversarial samples
that fool the ad-blocker. To defend from adversarial attacks, a
portfolio of techniques has been proposed [41, 42, 45, 46, 48],
none of which seem to solve the adversarial-attacks problem.
8 Conclusions
The progress of computer-vision systems has allowed building
systems that have a human-level performance for tasks that
are solvable within a few seconds by humans experts, such
as image classification. With these developments in machine
learning, we have also observed a trend towards massive and
resource-hungry models that require specialised hardware
(like GPUs and TPUs) or privacy-invasive training procedures.
Little effort has been invested in building models that are
suitable for tasks on edge devices, like mobile phones and
laptops. In our focus area, machine learning based ad blockers
have made a recent appearance in the research community,
and the heavily over-fitting filter list-based ad blockers are
the dominant paradigm.
With PERCIVAL, we illustrate that it is possible to devise
models that block ads, while rendering images inside the
browser. Our implementation inside Chromium shows an
rendering time overhead of 4.55%. This slowdown, although
non-negligible, shows the feasibility of deploying traditionally
heavyweight models (i.e. deep neural networks) inside the
critical path of the rendering engine of a browser. We show
that our perceptual ad-blocking model can replicate EasyList
rules with an accuracy of 96.76%, making PERCIVAL into
a viable and complementary ad blocking layer. Finally,
we demonstrate off the shelf language-agnostic detection
due to the fact that our models do not depend on textual
information. Further, we also show that PERCIVAL is a
compelling blocking mechanism for first-party Facebook
sponsored content, for which traditional filter based solutions
are less effective.
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